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THOMAS SCHEFFER
MATERIALITIES OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
ABSTRACT. The author explores materialities as pre-established and co-producing
features of criminal proceedings. This is done by discussing courtrooms, ﬁles and
stories in relation to English Crown Court hearings. The three materialities gain
signiﬁcance in the course of the court hearing, but do not derive from it. They exceed
the course of talk-in-court. Once the hearing started, the pre-established materialities
can be referred to but not simply modiﬁed. Materialities, in this line, provide stability
and guidance for the hearing. They facilitate, purify and condense it. However, their
temporal separation causes problems for those who run the show. Materialities can
be employed but not fully integrated. Unwelcome parts do, at times, disturb, disrupt
and complicate the current dealings.
‘‘State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space’’.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Some time ago, I found myself in a tricky situation. I was reading
‘‘my’’ abstract prepared some months ago for a talk on an upcoming
conference. Especially the ambition to work out the ‘‘materiality of
legal discourse’’ seemed to me now rather ambitious. How could ‘that
author’ promise such ﬁndings? How could I keep this promise that
seemed obvious to me while writing the abstract?
The following investigation stems from such a confrontational
situation not unfamiliar to academic scholars. The situation of giving
a lively talk (c), while sticking to a prepared paper (b) on the basis of
an announced abstract (a), I ﬁgured, refers itself nicely to the issue
treated here: the assorted materialities (a/b) of talk in court (c). Such
a building up may teach something about what Goﬀman called
‘‘planned situations’’ and the methods and resources necessary to
1 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
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realise them2. The inquiry3 is informed by ethnography and semiotics
insofar they bridge process and event, formation and articulation.4
The following endeavour is, in this manner, critical towards ‘spatial’
approaches that map out discursive ﬁelds while not accounting for
their becoming.5
The planned situations I focus on here are Crown Court hearings
in England.6 In Crown Courts, juries decide in the light of two
competing cases whether the defendant is ‘‘guilty beyond reasonable
doubt’’. The following transcript covers a sentencing hearing. The
2 This query belongs to ‘‘law in action’’ studies. See M. Travers and J.F. Manzo
(eds), Law in Action. Ethnomethodological and Conversation Analytic Approaches to
Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth/Ashgate, 1997). These studies ask for ‘‘the methods by
which legal settings and situations such as a call to the police, police interrogations
and courts and trials are socially organised’’ (S. Hester and P. Eglin, A Sociology of
Crime (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 17). This movement refers back to
Garﬁnkel’s studies of work: ‘‘Brieﬂy, he argued that sociologists who study the
various arts and sciences of practical action typically investigate social aspects of, for
instance, music, without addressing how musicians manage to play music together.
Similarly, when they investigate activities in the legal professions, sociologists tend to
describe various ‘social’ inﬂuences on the growth and development of legal institu-
tions while taking for granted that lawyers write briefs, present cases, interrogate
witnesses, and engage in legal reasoning.’’ (M. Lynch, Scientiﬁc Practice and Or-
dinary Action. Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 114).
3 This article is written as conceptual piece for a bigger research at the FU Berlin
comparing the practicalities of defence representation in four diﬀerent jurisdictions
(US, UK, Germany, Italy). See for further information, www.law-in-action.org.
4 I refer to the use of semiotics in discourse analysis as presented in W. Keane,
‘‘Semiotics and the Social Analysis of Material Things’’, Language & Communication
23 (2003), 409–425 or J. Carter, ‘‘Telling Times: History, Emplotment, and Truth’’,
History and Theory 42 (February 2003), 1–27. A useful combination of ethnography
and semiotics (Peirce) is presented by W. Keane, Signs of Recognition. Powers and
Hazards of Representation in an Indonesian Society (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 1997). See as well P. Manning, Semiotics and Field-
work (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987).
5 Goodrich combines spatial and temporal facets by studying ‘‘text in its textual
types, its models of exposition and production (…) and, further, the space of its
stagings (mises en sce´ne) and its syntax, which is not just the articulation of its
signiﬁers and its references to being or to truth but also the disposition of its pro-
cedures and everything invested in them’’ (P. Goodrich, Languages of Law: From
Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990), 114).
6 For an overview see R.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940) 1967).
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judge is asked to sentence Mr Blue, who at this occasion pleads guilty
to the oﬀence of ‘‘indecent assault’’:
Clerk: Are you Tim Blue?
Mr Blue: I am.
Clerk: Please sit down.
Mr Doubt: Your honour I defend Mr Blue.
Judge: Yes, Mr Doubt.
Mr Doubt: My learned friend Mr Hunt represents the prosecution.
Your honour this defendant pleaded not guilty to the
single count of indecent assault. That plea was entered
on the 19th July. Can I ask that he be re-arraigned,
please?
Judge: Yes, certainly.
Clerk: Tim Blue, you are charged on this indictment with
indecent assault. The particulars of the oﬀence being
that on the 3rd day of March 2000 you indecently as-
saulted Kim Baker, a female person. Do you plead
guilty or not guilty?
Defendant: Guilty.
Clerk: Guilty, thank you. Can you sit down?
Mr Hunt: Yes, your honour my learned friend’s made it plain to
me that that plea is entered on a basis of the defendant’s
interview, it’s really page 5 of the interview.
Judge: Yes, let me just have a look at that.
Mr Hunt: At 24.08 just above that time where the defendant
agrees that he cuddled up to the complainant and tou-
ched her breasts inside her clothing when she was saying
‘‘You better to.’’ That encapsulates the conduct.
Judge: The basis —.
Mr Hunt: — the conduct.
Judge: — of the plea.
Mr Hunt: Yes.
The brief hearing joins components that were apparently not pro-
duced within the hearing. The barristers, comparable to academics
when giving a paper, draw on pre-established entities. The ‘‘partic-
ulars of the oﬀence’’ for instance were speciﬁed during a meeting with
defence and prosecution shortly before the hearing.
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Comparably to Durkheim’s deﬁnition of ‘‘social facts’’ – outdoing
psychological will powers7 – I suggest that materialities of discourse
exceed face-to-face interaction. Durkheim’s indicator for social facts
is modiﬁed accordingly: materialities are out of reach for direct
interaction. This deﬁnition has some advantages for empirical stud-
ies. It does not carry the common spatial connotations. It does not
presume a ﬁxed shape and essence. It avoids the connotation of
touch, weight, or distribution. Materialities are rather deﬁned rela-
tionally. They appear and work as ‘material’ for the focal setting (the
situated hearing) due to their diﬀerent mode and rhythm of becom-
ing: the drafting of texts, the compiling of ﬁles, or the training of
bodies. Thanks to their separation from the course of conversation,
they turn into the hearing’s co-producers.
How can a micro-sociologist conceptualise events as drawn to-
gether out of diﬀerent substances? How can one accept pre-estab-
lished entities while at the same time appreciating the event’s
dynamics? Doesn’t materialism lead straight to structuralism?8 At
stake seem the interrelations of proximity and historicity, of contin-
gency and pre-conﬁguration, of local production and trans-local
products. I claim that legal proceedings can be appropriately analy-
sed only with reference to the multi-temporal conditions under which
they unfold.
7 ‘‘Social facts’’ represent ‘‘ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the
remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual. Not only
are these types of behaviour and thinking external to the individual, but they are
endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he wishes
it or not, they impose themselves upon him’’ (E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological
Method. And Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method (London and Basingstoke:
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 51). They resemble ‘objective’ constraints, norms
and structures, open to scientiﬁc observation.
8 Answers should avoid the two ‘‘equally powerful dissatisfactions: when social
scientists concentrate on what could be called the micro level, that is face to face
interactions, local sites, they quickly realize that many of elements necessary to make
sense of the situation are already in place or are coming from far away (…) This is
why so much work has been dedicated to notions such as society, norms, values (…)
all terms that aim at designating what gives shape to micro interaction. But then,
once this new level has been reached, a second type of dissatisfaction begins. Social
scientists now feel that something is missing, that the abstraction of terms (…) seems
too great, and that one needs to reconnect, through an opposite move, back to the
ﬂesh-and-blood local situations’’ (B. Latour, ‘‘On Recalling ANT’’, in J. Law and
J. Hassard, (eds), Actor Network Theory and After, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1999a), 16f.)
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2. ENCOUNTERING MATERIALITIES OF DISCOURSE
The suggested discourse-analysis aims for two analytical motions that
are elsewhere held apart. On the one hand it accounts for the product
of discursive activities (how materials are put together). On the other
hand it accounts for the involvement of materials into the course-of-
discourse (how materials shape activities).9 By linking these con-
structivist and materialist queries, I hope to gain new insights into the
relations of process and event, pre-trial and trial, preparation and
enactment.
As the reader may ﬁnd out shortly, the double perspective does
not lead to a dialectical or dualist approach. Instead of contrasting
diﬀerences in kind (action-structure), the double perspective em-
phasises diﬀerences in degree of relatively solid and ﬂuid, self-gov-
erned and adaptable entities.10 Process and event are multiply linked
due to these assorted co-producing-products. Owing to the fact that
production and consumption are separated in time, the links happen
to be temporary and partial.11
In the following, I am going to explicate this abstract framework
in line with the abovementioned sentencing hearing. What could
resemble materialities for this brief event? Two deﬁnitions shall
control empirical observability: (a) the entity is essential part of the
event; (b) it is productive outside the event; (c) it is produced before
the event. What elements are concurrently involved and pre-estab-
lished, employed and self-contained? In the following, I introduce
three – out of a whole lot (from gazes or gestures to law books or
costumes) of relatively ephemeral or lasting - entities that are valuable
for English Crown Court proceedings: naming courtrooms (1.1.), ﬁles
(1.2.) and stories (1.3.).
9 Keane’s use of the term ‘‘trajectory’’ denotes the same two-fold: ‘‘By trajectory I
mean to stress two dimensions of motion, that by which objects circulate through
people’s activities and that by which activities produce objects, relations, or events
that can enter into new orders of activity.’’ (W. Keane, supra n. 4, 67).
10 G. Deleuze, supra n. 1.
11 This separation is often ignored in social constructivism. The construction is
either imagined as one instance of pure creation or as one integrated process creating
all its parts. The fact, however, that something is involved in a construction process
does not mean that it is itself constructed in the same process. See for the distinction
of production and consumption, De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday-Life
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988).
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2.1. Courtrooms
The hearing took place around mid of 2002. It lasted no longer than ten minutes.
Shortly before it commenced, two guards accompanied the defendant (without hand-
cuﬀs like they sometimes do) to the dock. The barristers arrived together after having
enjoyed a quick instant coﬀee in the ‘‘counsel’s lounge’’ (located just behind the
public gallery). They climbed down the stairs, still absorbed by their prior chatter.
They took their seats at the two ends of the front bench and awaited the judge who
just retired from another sentencing hearing. (There were ﬁve or six this morning,
plus several applications regarding bail and dates.)
Everybody else, to keep it short, was in place for the impending dealings: defen-
dant, barristers, public and clerk, only the usher strolled around to ready the setting.
‘‘Rising court’’, the usher suddenly growled. All those present in the room got quickly
on their feet. From barrister down to defendant or court reporter, everybody
expressed, as it is said, respect to judge and court. It was this very moment of the judge
entering when the old assistant next to the clerk instigated the tape-recording.
After a brief exchange between clerk and defendant (to settle his personal identity),
the hearing speeded up. The defence barrister got on his feed to ask the judge whether
the former plea could be altered. To do so, the barrister had to await the judge’s go-
ahead, conveyed via brief eye-contact. (There may be a moment, when the barrister is
about to rise to show his aspiration. At this very moment – neither fully on his feet nor
on the bench – he could still withdraw and sit back.)
The judge was happy to accept a new plea. The clerk then repeated the questions
already asked weeks ago: ‘‘guilty or not guilty?’’ Now the defendant had to rise from
his seat. He received the question silently and responded without any further advice:
‘‘Guilty!’’
How is it possible that even the ethnographer – as alien (German)
and layperson (sociologist) – could follow the hearing?12 I identiﬁed
the legal roles, the competing parties, the represented cases and the
relevant audience. It is to a good deal, I assume, the court’s spatial
ordering – the positioning of bodies, voices and gazes – that makes
the hearing accessible. The arrangements guide the performances as
well as their reception.
In order to appreciate this eﬀect as material, one shall reﬂect on
the way the spatial device can be observed prior to the session. In this
line, it seems important, to distinguish speciﬁcity and generality of
Crown Courts. Speciﬁcity appears via comparison, here of an old and
a new court:
During my ﬁeldwork, I regularly visited two courthouses. One originated from
the 14th century and served as criminal and civil court over centuries. Architecture
and furniture survived centuries. Local historians told me how trials were conducted
12 Between 2001 and 2004, I spend about 50 days in English Crown Courts and
Magistrates Courts. On top, I shadowed solicitors and barristers during their work
days over several months. I thank ‘‘my lawyers’’ for their exceptional openness and
support.
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in Victorian times, how the gallery was ﬁlled with ‘‘plebs’’ and the benches next to
the judge with the prosperous ladies. The jury was chosen from the honourable,
credible and male citizens.13 Outside court, the death penalty (mostly hanging) took
place as public spectacle sometimes witnessed by several thousands people.
The other court looked utterly diﬀerent. It is hosted in a functional building form
the eighties. The entrance area reminds of an airport. Bodies are checked by uni-
formed security staﬀ. Trials are announced on screens like the arrivals/departures of
ﬂights. In the courts the atmosphere is business-like. White walls, light furniture, no
decoration – the rooms evoke eﬃcacy rather than greatness.
The old court seems to accentuate the extraordinary spectacle
while easily overpowering the ones staged.14 The new court, in con-
trast, highlights the eﬃcient treatment of the case-load. The staged
counsels and witnesses – despite wig and oath – appear as rather
ordinary. The diﬀerent eﬀects conveyed by the courts are manifest
and diﬀuse at the same time.
What are common features that make a Crown Court a Crown
Court? The court is, I propose, a discourse automat arranging the
staging of cases in a standardised way. The arrangements deﬁne what
can be legitimately expected and, in this line, provide the grounds to
anticipate and prepare cases in advance.15 The arrangement may be
well illustrated in a simplistic model:
The court resembles an order of relational discourse-positions: in
case of a trial, the witness is placed opposite the evidence-assessing
jury; the judge, in any case, is located opposite the defendant;
13 There are striking similarities to public experiments in early Natural Sciences. See
S. Shapin and S. Schaﬀer, Leviathan and the Air-pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985) and S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth. Civility and Science
in Seventeenth-century England (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).
14 Later I came across reports on the new Crown Court in Manchester that
apparently does not fulﬁll its functions. The building, it was claimed by those
working in it, ‘‘does not work’’. They criticised the slow security checks, the lack of
conference rooms and storage space for ﬁles, the tiny library and the uncomfortable
barrister’s lounge. See The Guardian, 30th June 2004.
15 Exemplary eﬀects of the courts’ standardisation are well described in the short
story ‘‘Rumpole and the Showfolk’’. ‘‘What are we doing to our clients?’’ Rumpole
rhetorically asks his fellow barristers. ‘‘Seeing they wear ties, and hats, keep their
hands out of their pockets, keep their voices up, call the judge ‘my lord’. Generally,
behave like grocers at the funeral. Whoever they may be.’’ (J. Mortimer, The Best of
Rumpole (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 81).
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defending and prosecuting barrister sit or stand right in front of the
judge16; the whole scenery is overlooked by the seated public. The
two barristers uniformed with grey wigs and black robes – ritually
covering individuality and, thus, ‘bias’ – represent the ‘‘inner circle’’
of the Crown Court17.
The court appears as moral space governed by observable traﬃc
rules18. Some of these rules: Witnesses e.g. do not talk to the jury
directly. They answer the barristers’ friendly or hostile questions by
turning to judge and jury. The defendant is not only placed far away
from his barrister but as well outside the turn-exchange.19 From the
defendant’s bench, one shall not address the court at all. The jury is
supposed to receive the cases solely from inside court: from witness-
examinations, the barristers’ closing speeches and the judge’s
summary. In the diagram, fat-lined boxes display these oﬃcial
16 ‘‘In the United States, it is accepted in most jurisdictions that the well of the
courtroom is within the lawyers’ control and lawyers are permitted to walk around
that area rather freely. Sometimes they may go over to the jury box to make a point
to them or sometimes to a spot distant from or close to a witness for dramatic
eﬀects.’’ (W.T. Pizzi, ‘‘Trials Without Truth. Why Our System of Criminal Trials has
become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to do to Rebuild it’’ (New York and
London: New York University Press, 1999), 126). Such behaviour would not comply
with English Crown Courts.
17 P. Rock, The Social World of an English Crown Court. Witness and Professionals
in the Crown Court Centre at Wooden Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
18 See J.M. Atkinson and P. Drew, ‘‘Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal
Interaction’’, Judicial Settings (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979).
19In the 18th century, defendants were still expected to defend themselves. See
for the historical rise of professional counsels and the degradation of the defen-
dant, J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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participants. With solely one of them missing, a trial hearing would
not take place. The broken lines show the additional participants.
They are regarded as quiet/invisible suppliers of case-information.
They work ‘in the shade’ of the public spectacle.
The spatial ordering is itself not a topic during trial. It is usually
co-enacted as factual and proper (like football teams co-enact the
football-pitch as the legitimate ground or TV-interviewees the news-
format while giving the interview). The discursive ordering is dele-
gated to the materiality of the courtroom.20 The court is neither a
passive discourse container nor simply the eﬀect of the situated dis-
course-in-action. It may be adequately described as a bundle of co-
producing forces:
 The courtroom displays the centre of attention of the hearing: the
addressing of the overhearing jury (as ‘‘judges of the facts’’) and/or
judge (as ‘‘judge of the law’’).
 The spatial ordering co-constitutes and identiﬁes signiﬁcant others:
the speaking representatives, the instructing/represented party and
the listening/judging recipients.
 The positioning of voices does signify their weight, such as being in
the stand (witness), on the dock (defendant) or on the bench
(judge). It dramatises the words spoken, links them to authorships
and transforms their usability.
 The hearing is freed of meta-discursive concerns regarding the
appropriateness of the standards for the actual matter at hand.
Only exceptionally and under certain conditions, the arrangement
is re-adjusted.21
Standardisation and neutrality refer to spatial pre-arrangements:
everything is put into place prior to the event. My point here is rather
trivial: during the trial, the clerk would not carry around tables,
count the jurors’ chairs or build a balustrade to separate public
20 See for Italian courts where video-recording was introduced, G.F. Lanzara and
G. Patriotta, ‘‘Technology and the Courtroom: An Inquiry into Knowledge Making
in Organizations’’, Journal of Management Studies 38 (2001), 944–971. One could
speak here of a crisis of material delegation.
21 The barristers may take oﬀ their wigs to demonstrate informality. This step can
be suggested when a young person is involved as oﬀender or witness. Video-links
may be used to examine vulnerable witnesses, etc.
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gallery and legal arena. The court is set for the hearing to start and
for the protagonists to take their roles.
Standardisation carries vast implications for the concept of justice.
Standardisation seems unproblematic when presented as equal
treatment. It seems problematic when linked to discriminating eﬀects.
In this line, feminist critiques demand more sensitivity for
‘exceptional’ cases.22 Such sensitivity, however, creates new prob-
lems. It presumes in parts what is meant to be open to doubt.
Standardisation, in contrast, allows the court’s detachment from the
proceedings. It remains in place no matter its course or outcome and
is, thus, available for others to come. The frequent legal reforms –
mostly aiming for more fairness and eﬃcacy – face the tension be-
tween standardisation and discrimination. How, reformers ask, could
courts be more case-sensitive without undermining the proceedings
autonomy? For now, I provide a fairly general conclusion. The
openness of the day in court hinges on stabilities built around it. The
pre-arrangements relief the current dealings and reduce what is at
issue.
2.2. Files
The courtroom is apparently just one co-producing materiality
amongst others. In Tim Blue’s sentencing hearing, for instance, re-
cords were at hand at diﬀerent sites in court. The barristers e.g. kept
their briefs in reaching distance on the desk. On the side, they kept
folders holding copies of the relevant ‘‘evidence’’ in the case. On the
back benches, assistants kept ready the comprehensive case-ﬁles.
I came across hearings that would not start without the ﬁles being
present.
Some utterances in court directly derive from the ﬁles. See for
instance the reference to ‘‘page 5’’ in Tim Blue’s sentencing hearing.
The prosecuting barrister actualised a portion of a police-interview
given by the defendant months before the hearing.
The counsel referred to ‘‘page 5’’ in order to precise the basis of the plea. He did so
without reading out the relevant pages of the police-interview. The ﬁled protocol did
the delivery. The protocol became, during pre-trial, the focal object for the com-
peting case-representation. As an object it was manipulated in various ways: sliced,
measured, counted – and acknowledged. The question of what really happened was
22 See S. Lees, Carnal Knowledge. Rape on Trial Lees (London: Penguin Group,
1996). A. Konradi, ‘‘Too Little too Late: Prosecutors’ Pre-Court Preparation of
Rape Survivors’’, Law and Social Inquiry 22/1 winter (1997), 1–54. Lee, 2001.
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translated into page-numbers: is the defendant guilty up to page 4 or 5 or even 6 or 7?
The binary code of guilty/not-guilty turned into degrees of guilt.
Parties regularly agree on contested and agreed issues (somehow
realising the score of the contest) in advance. The mapping out of the
legal debate demonstrates a crucial function for legal proceedings: the
co-construction of common grounds.
The ﬁle is, more generally, the site where points are mobilised for
the day in court. Here, arguments are developed, potentials assessed,
weaknesses identiﬁed. They are guided stepwise into the light of the
legal discourse.More generally, they are qualiﬁed, tuned and tested for
the later utilisation. Via ﬁle-work, the case is composed as a workable
and resisting unit. Where is the best site to study this important work
in detail? It is the law ﬁrm, where solicitors meet clients, colleagues and
informants. More often though, they meet case-ﬁles and work with
them on paper. The record grows in the frequency of these human-ﬁle-
encounters.
Due to their focus on ﬁle-work, lawyers’ workplaces seem ste-
reotypical. They seem like supplements of a massive bureaucracy.
Knowing one, it seems, means knowing them all. Let’s take the ﬁles:
whatever case they hold, they oﬀer the same three fractions: (1) the
prosecution-bundle containing the disclosed evidence against the
client; (2) the journal of case-work including dated correspondence,
diary notes and ﬁle notes; (3) the defence bundle with the collected
and drafted statements. It is this orderliness that invites inferences
such as this one from Latour’s Laboratory Study on judges’ work-
places:
‘‘The question of homogeneity and heterogeneity between texts and things marks a
contrast, which would strike even the most inattentive visitor. One can climb from
the cellars of the Palais Royal, in which linear kilometres of archives lie in hiber-
nation; to the attics which house the oﬃces of the commissaire du government and
the documentation service, without ﬁnding any real diﬀerence between the objects
that are essential to each branch of the work of the Conseil: ﬁles, more ﬁles,
nothing but ﬁles, to which one should add cupboards, tables and chairs – which
diﬀer in price, depending on the rank of the employee – varying numbers of books,
and, last but not least, a profusion of elastic bands, paper clips, folders, and rubber
stamps. (…) But in the laboratory no room looks like any other, because the
diﬀerentiation of space is eﬀected by the distribution of the machines which allow
the competences of the physiologist, the neurophysiologist, the molecular biologist
(…) therefore, the nature of the Conseil does not depend on its equipment, but on
the homogeneity of the world of ﬁles that are kept, ordered, archived, and pro-
cessed, and upon the homogeneity of a staﬀ that is renewed, maintained and dis-
ciplined.’’ (2003: 3f.)
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Are legal ﬁles appropriately characterised as bureaucratic? Defence
ﬁles for Crown Court proceedings resemble, I state diﬀerently, crea-
tive and resourceful logbooks. They remind of scrapbooks chronically
ﬁlled with bits and pieces: drafted stories, memos on rumours, news-
paper articles, photographs, to-do lists etc. Files initiate inventive
brainstorming as well as systematic legal service. File–solicitor inter-
action encloses tinkering, detailed drafting and constant administra-
tion. To make a long story short: once the ethnographer draws closer
to the ﬁles, alleged homogeneity turns into multiplicity (of writing/
reading acts), impersonal bureaucracy into creative (legal) engineer-
ing, passive recording into absorbing ‘‘mobilisation’’.23 The ﬁles are,
after all, marked by tense and moving projects of representation.
What do we learn from Latour’s detachment? How shall we
encounter materiality to avoid it? (1) The features of things are
located on diﬀerent levels. Files, for instance, are black boxes that
‘look’ similar. They reveal what they do and undo via their becoming
in time. This might be diﬀerent to the inventory of laboratories
exposing ‘‘anything you wished to know about the nature of the
place’’24 (Latour, 2003: 4). In both cases, however, observation hinges
on the observer’s ability to position the object in a dynamic assem-
blage. (2) Latour, apparently, was used to laboratories and their
inhabitants. In the judges’ oﬃces, his learnt eye encountered some-
thing unfamiliar: a ‘class of things’ that involves speciﬁcities in other
ways. He, nonetheless, used familiar schemes to specify them.
To grasp the ﬁles’ vigour, one shall encounter them ‘‘in action’’.
This view refers to Ethnomethodological Workplace Studies and the
real-time analysis of ‘‘human–machine communication’’25. The ﬁles’
involvement can be spotted in ﬁle solicitor interaction. File-work is
about ‘bringing the ﬁle in order’ and ‘doing what the ﬁle calls for’.
File-work is routine-work, which does not mean that every ﬁle is
consulted on a daily basis. At the beginning, ﬁles are consulted in
23 T. Scheﬀer, ‘‘The Duality of Mobilisation. Following the Rise and Fall of an
Alibi-story on its Way to Court’’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33/3,
September (2003), 313–347.
24 B. Latour, ‘‘Scientiﬁc Objects and Legal Objectivity – Portrait of the Conseil
d’Etat as Laboratory’’, in A. Pottage (ed), Making Persons and Things (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 4.
25 See L. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions. The Problem of Human–Machine-
Communication (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1987).
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loose rhythms, while closer to the day in court work-intervals cut
short. The ﬁle allows, as time-binding-device26, extended interruption
and continuation.
The ﬁle can be touched on as partial transcript of defence work,
open to sequential analysis somewhat similar to the ones prepared for
conversation analysis. In the case of Tim Blue, one is able to distillate
the following chain of inscriptions in regard to the recruitment of
witnesses for the defence:
On the 14th September, the solicitor met the ‘‘probable witnesses’’. The assessment
for the record does not sound cheering: ‘‘Both cannot believe the allegations. They will
give evidence about the morning after the alleged incident. Warning of making false
statement on oath.’’
On the 23rd September, a Diary Note reminded the solicitor to draft the two
statements. In a letter to client 6 days later the solicitor ensured that ‘‘the witness
statements are readily drafted’’. One the same day, he sent the typed versions to the
‘‘two witness’’.
On the 3rd October, one witness wrote back: ‘‘I do not agree with everything in it!’’
The hearing was meant to take place in just 8 days.
The hearing was adjourned several times: at this point from the 12thOctober to the
19th October. On the 12th October, client, barrister and one representative from the
law ﬁrmmet for ‘‘a conference’’. One day before, the solicitor talked to the client on the
telephone. He concluded in a ﬁle note: ‘‘Client conﬁrms that witnesses know about the
trial date.’’ Furthermore: ‘‘At the conference, we will decide which of the defence
witnesses we want to call to the Hearing next week and Richard (the solicitor) will
contact them.’’ Another practical problem occurred: ‘‘Client says that two witnesses
might have problems to attend. One has a new Job in a supermarket.’’
On the 17th October, Richard dictated for the ﬁle: ‘‘Preparing amendments to
statements’’ The same day, he wrote to the two witnesses: ‘‘Please sign and date the
typed version.’’ In a ﬁle note, he added: ‘‘On the next (tomorrow’s) conference, we will
decide who of the two should attend court.’’ Due to the pending hearing, he faxed the
two statements to the Barrister right away.
Before the hearing, the solicitor invests a lot of work to present
witnesses to speak for the case. The ﬁle keeps track of these invest-
ments. Why is this? Why is the ﬁle such a rich source and how does
this characterise its materiality? I want to give some ‘good reasons for
good legal records’27. The reasons explicate the ﬁle’s practical status,
26 Luhmann explains the speciﬁcity of legal discourse accordingly: ‘‘Every com-
munication binds time by deﬁning the system-state from which the next communi-
cation has to continue.’’ (N. Luhmann, Niklas, ‘‘Die Funktion des Rechts’’, Das
Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995), 126.
27 See H. Garﬁnkel, ‘‘Good Reasons for Bad Clinic Records’’, in Studies in Eth-
nomethodology (Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
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its capacity for ‘‘time-space distanciation’’28 and, based on this, its
usability for the analysis of legal proceedings:
 Mobilisation: Mobilisation means to identify points that may
become important in due course and to make them ready at hand
for the day in court. The ﬁle is full of singularised claims29 – and
the solicitor’s eﬀorts to keep an overview, to foster them, gather
support for them, and by doing so, to compose a strong case. The
points to be made in court pass arrays of tests in order to avoid
damaging surprise30.
 Accounting: The ﬁrm’s solicitors are expected to book-keep
their work (in 6 minutes-units). The telephone conversations,
ﬁle-study, written letters, read correspondence, drafting of
statements etc. is quantiﬁed and justiﬁed (as necessary work to
do). Accordingly, one ﬁnds bits and pieces of evidence no matter
their stage: oﬀhand rumours, careless presumptions or wishful
thinking. After trial, all work units are tot up to a single ﬁgure
showing the ﬁrm’s case-related costs.
 Continuation: The ﬁle shows what is done so far and what needs
to be done next. Inscriptions formed on one occasion become
prescriptions for the next and so forth. Filed inscriptions provide
the grounds for coming ﬁle-work. The solicitor by referring to the
ﬁle as medium and object gets increasingly entangled in a web of
ﬁled commitments. This orientation is necessary due to the many
cases under construction and the intervals of case-work. The
documentation of open/completed tasks, moreover, shall reduce
ﬂaws and their fatal eﬀects on case and client.
 Division of labour: Due to relatively long chains of delegation –
from client, to solicitor, to barrister – Crown Court cases need
to be communicated several times. Thus, one ﬁnds piles of
correspondence and instructions – all meant to exchange valu-
able information and to integrate the growing ensemble. The ﬁle
28 See A. Giddens, ‘‘Time and Social Organisation’’, in Social Theory and Modern
Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 140–165. For an overview see B. Adams,
‘‘Industrial Time and Power’’, in Time & Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1994), 104–127.
29 File-notes often display raw material to be mobilised such as the following:
‘‘Complainant was suﬀering from a sexually transmitted disease. Client says he
would not have risked trying to have sex (…) Complainant was out clubbing between
the date of the alleged incident and the date that our client was arrested which of
course was about a four-week period. (…) He said that he believes she now has a new
boyfriend. She has left Crime-town and now lives in Court-village.’’
30 T. Scheﬀer, supra n. 23.
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facilitates, furthermore, the diversiﬁcation of ‘‘participation
roles’’ within the ensemble.31 It shall supply the information
necessary to take the role in open court.
 Organised memory: The circulation of case-information relies on
the ﬁle’s completeness. Everything that enters the ﬁle is sup-
posed to remain in it. As a result, it swells with each ﬁle-work
session. The ﬁle as archive does not forget.32 It reports regard-
less on the client’s early optimism and the solicitor’s encour-
agement, on the successful as well as failed inquiries, or keeps
the several drafts of statements that never made it to court.33
Similar to the courtroom, the ﬁle appears as pre-conﬁgured
materiality in relation to the hearing. The matters on trial are sorted
and composed prior to it. They can be interpreted, raised or even read
out in court. The ﬁle, compared to the talk-in-court, resides in
another time-space. This separation, I suggest, make the ﬁle a useful
co-producer of the court hearing.
2.3. Stories
The story of ‘‘what really happened that night at the defendant’s
house’’ seems inseparable from the ﬁle’s inscriptions. Or more gen-
erally: every word seems bound to the media delivering it. Despite the
common distinction of medium and content,34 how could stories
count as materiality in their own right?
The clue may lie in the story’s numerous appearances. Foucault,
for instance, values the statement as material entity because it out-
lasts a number of involvements. These involvements trigger the
statement’s weight and eﬃcacy:
31 E. Goﬀman, ‘‘Footing’’, in Forms of Talk (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania
Press, 1979). Goﬀman’s distinction of animator, author and principal is well ex-
plained by Keane: ‘‘An example familiar to Americans is the division among press
secretary, speech writer, and president’’ (W. Keane, Signs of Recognition. Powers and
Hazards of Representation in an Indonesian Society (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 1997), 139) – a division of labour, one may add, that
depends on elaborated preparation.
32 See M. Lynch, ‘‘Archives in formation: Privileged Spaces, Popular Archives and
Paper Trails’’, History of the Human Sciences 12/2 (1999), 65–87.
33 T. Scheﬀer, ‘‘Die Karriere rechtswirksamer Argumente. Ansatzpunkte einer
historiographischen Diskursanalyse der Gerichtsverhandlung’’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Rec-
htssoziologie 24 Heft 2 (2003), 151–181.
34 See H.U. Gumbrecht and K.L. Pfeiﬀer, Die Materialita¨t der Kommunikation
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988).
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‘‘Instead of being something said once and for all – and lost in the past like the result
of a battle, a geological catastrophe, or the death of a king – the statement, as it
emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various
ﬁelds of use, is subjected to transferences of modiﬁcations, is integrated into oper-
ations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or eﬀaced. Thus the state-
ment circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire,
serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes
a theme of appropriation or rivalry’’.35
The materiality of our story may arise accordingly. It has been em-
ployed several times during the pre-trial: in the police-interview, the
primary disclosure, the defence statement, the brief to counsel, the
barrister’s notes, the plea bargaining etc. Every employment triggers
the story’s re-appearance and modiﬁcation, and hence, continuation
and imposition.36 The story’s role in court was stimulated and
restricted by these micro-historical layers. The barristers announced
‘‘page 5’’ as ‘what the case is’ and by doing so, called (just) the
following part as basis for the ensuing sentencing:
BLUE … JUST SNOGGED WITH HER, JUST PLAYED
WITH HER BREASTS, AS FAR AS I KNOW THAT‘
ALL I DID, THEN I GOT UP AND SHE SAID YOU
HAD BETTER GO AND I JUST APOLOGISED, I
JUST SAID SORRY, I SAID YOU WONT SAY
OWT TO JANE WILL YOU
DC So you’d started kissing with her, did she resist that?
BLUE SHE DID AT FIRST AND THEN SHE JUST RE-
LAXED AFTERWARDS
DC Is that because you told her to relax?
BLUE NO I DIDN’T SAY, CAN’T REMEMBER SAYING
THAT
DC Right so you’ve been kissing with her and she’s told you
to go and you’ve carried on kissing with her, was that
with consent or without?
35 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language
(London: Tavistock, 1972), 118.
36 ‘‘What (…) I call iterability is at once that which tends to attain plenitude and that
which bars access to it. Through the possibility of repeating every mark as the same it
makes way for an idealization that seems to deliver the full presence of ideal objects…
but this repeatability itself ensures that the full presence of a singularity thus repeated
comports in itself the reference to something else, thus rending the full presence that it
nevertheless announces. This is why iteration is not simply repetition.’’ J. Derrida,
Limited Inc. (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 129.
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BLUE WITHOUT I SHOULD THINK – ALL I CAN DO IS
REMEMBER JUST CUDDLING UP TO HER AND
JUST TOUCHING HER BREASTS
DC Is this outside her clothing or inside her pyjamas?
BLUE INSIDE I THINK
DC And what was she saying while you were doing this?
BLUE SHE JUST SAID YOU HAD BETTER GO
One can grasp the full signiﬁcance of this reduction only in the light of
the earlier versions. How much is cut oﬀ here? How much remains
unsaid? What is the price the parties pay for the deal? Answering these
queries, I state, is not feasible without including the story’s career.37
The story of what happened during that night emerged early at the
police-station. The complainant narrated – or better co-narrated
together with the police oﬃcers – how Tim Blue entered the bedroom,
how he started kissing and stroking her, how he went even further and
made her ‘‘doing things’’. Finally, she managed to get rid of him, of the
one she trusted, of her good old father-friend. The story unfolded
dialogically in a question–answer play. Round by round the co-nar-
rationmoved further into the territory of guilt and shame. The result: a
storyline that resists careless revision, capable to incorporate vast de-
tails (or to shrink to a plot), and anchored by spatiotemporal ‘facts’.38
37 The analyses of discursive careers can be found in E. Goﬀman, Asylums:
Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York:
Doubleday, 1961); I. Koptytoﬀ, ‘‘The Cultural Biography of Things: Commodi-
ﬁcation as Process’’ in A. Appadurai, (ed.) The Social Life of Things: Com-
modities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986), 64–91;
A. Cambrosio, C. Limoges and D. Pronovest, ‘‘Representing Biotechnology: An
Ethnography of Quebec Science Policy’’, Social Studies of Science 20/2 May
(1990), 195–227; M. Goodwin, He-said-She-said: Talk as Social Organisation
among Black Children (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1990); H. Doering and S. Hirschauer, ‘‘Die Biographie der Dinge. Eine Ethnog-
raphie musealer Repra¨sentation, in K. Amann and S. Hirschauer (eds.) Die
Befremdung der eigenen Kultur. Zur ethnographischen Herausforderung soziologi-
scher Empirie (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1997); A. Meehan, ‘‘The Organiza-
tional Career of Gang Statistics: The Politics of Policing Gangs’’, Sociological
Quarterly 41/3 (summer 2000), 337–370.
38 Lynch and Bogen explain the signiﬁcance of these anchors: ‘‘The binding force of
the accusatory narrative operates on at least two fronts: the various references to
dates, places, and activities hang together in a coherent narrative, while at the same
time the references implicate and bind [the accused interviewee, T.S.] to the scene as
constituted by those particulars.’’ (M. Lynch and D. Bogen, David, The Spectacle of
History – Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1996), 171). The relevancy of such signs for historical
accounts is explored in J. Carter, supra n. 4.
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The story re-appears in the police-interview with the accused. The
interviewers use it to confront the suspect with the story’s progres-
sion. The questions lead Tim Blue through the account to provoke
incriminating responses exploitable in due course:
BLUE …ALL I CAN DO IS REMEMBER JUST CUD-
DLING UP TO HER AND JUST TOUCHING HER
BREASTS
DC Is this outside her clothing or inside her pyjamas?
BLUE INSIDE I THINK
DC … She then says that you undid your trouser zip and
your belt?
BLUE NO – I CAN’T REMEMBER DOING THAT
DC And that you then took hold of her left wrist and pulled
her hand and put it down your trousers and inside your
underpants and made her touch your erect penis?
BLUE NO – I CAN’T REMEMBER DOING THAT
DC And you then put your hand down her shorts and began
to touch her vaginal area, do you remember that?
BLUE NO, NO.
Unfortunately for the defence the confrontational interrogation
worked out. The interviewee and later client did not abandon the
invoked claims. He simply ‘‘cannot remember’’. Instead of oﬀering a
counter-narrative, Blue just left gaps for imaginaries and ‘common
sense’ to step in. From this point onwards, the victim’s story became
the hegemonic account.39
The hegemonic story circulated among the opponents. It became
designated as prosecution-case. The defence focussed on delimiting
its inferences: ‘He did not go that far! He stopped earlier…!’ The
story reappeared accordingly within the defence ensemble:
The solicitor wrote to barrister in the instructions: ‘‘Our client’s interview with the
police does contain some admissions of kissing and touching. Our client does state that
there was a point when complainant resisted his advances and yet those advances
continued. He, of course, denies all other allegations made by the complainant. […] If
the Crown [prosecution, T.S.] insist that any guilty plea has to be on the basis of their
evidence as it is at the moment then we do not think our client can plead guilty, as he
does not accept all of the allegations that have been made.’’
The defence statement disclosed the following version:
39 See P. Ewick, ‘‘Subversive Stories and hegemonic tales: Toward a Sociology of
Narrative’’, Law & Society Review 29 (1995), 197–226.
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‘‘The Defendant put his arm around the Complainant and began to kiss her. The
Defendant admits that there was contact between the Complainant and himself at
this time and the Complainant was not obeying to this resisting the Defendant’s
advances at this time. The Complainant was clearly giving her implied consent to
this. When the Complainant indicated that she no longer consented to this, the
Defendant stopped immediately and he left the Complainant’s bedroom….’’
The solicitor, in the following weeks of pre-trial, tried to attack the
story’s allies, to cut oﬀ its social support. He, in addition, tried to
strengthen his client’s credibility. Tim Blue’s ‘‘I cannot remember’’
had to be replaced by something more substantial for the jury. The
hegemonic story occupied the discursive space for any ‘version’ to
come and caused some hard thinking on the site of the defence.
In case of a jury trial, the story would have directed the questions
and answers in the friendly examination. The prosecution would have
led the ‘victim’ through the plot ensuring that an analogous account
reached the jury. The defence would have tried to delimit the story’s
implications. During the cross-examination, the story’s versions
would have provided a good deal of details to raise doubts. But then,
there were the client’s admissions and weak excuses. They seemed
harder to ﬁght than the victim’s subjective recall. But what then made
the complainant hesitate to trial the indecent assault in open court?
The complainant, I speculate, avoided the deconstructive questions
by the defence meant to multiply details and, by doing so, trigger
confusion. She did not wish, as she told her barrister, to expose ‘‘all
these things’’ in public. To make a complicated deliberation short: the
defence feared the bad start while the prosecution feared the com-
pulsory orality in court.
What happened after the Crown’s Counsel announced the reduced
basis of the guilty plea? The story ‘of what happened’ was cut down
to ‘‘page 5’’. However, the full story – once in the world – was not
that easy to delimit. Tim Blue, very soon after the hearing, became
confronted with the full version and its moral implications. This time
the story appeared in the local newspaper and caused trouble – or
better extra-judicial punishment - by his employer and neighbours.
‘‘Tim Blue, 52, who had worked for the past 23 years at […] ‘misread the signals’
from a 26-year-old woman. One night at the […] after the woman had gone to bed,
Blue appeared at her bedside, carrying drinks, said prosecutor Mr Hunt. Blue began
talking to her and then touched her breasts over the clothing and inside, Mr Hunt
added. ‘He kissed her, telling her to relax and enjoy it. Afterwards, he said he was
sorry.’ Blue told the police he had been ‘totally stupid’.’’
How can this brief reconstruction contribute to the materiality-claim?
Is the story really another pre-established co-producer of the hearing?
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The story’s career did pass several sites including a series of police-
interviews, the client–solicitor consultation, the defence statement,
the brief to counsel, the conference with counsel, the plea bargaining,
the sentencing hearing and so forth. Its multi-sited becoming and the
diﬀerent roles it played on the way illustrate striking similarities to
the aforementioned materialities: the story was put together prior to
the hearing; it outlasted several events; it grounded and informed the
hearing; it survived the hearing. Similar to ﬁle and courtroom, the
story resides in expanded time and space.
The case-story, understood in this way as materiality, holds
properties that comfort the legal proceeding. Whenever referred to,
the story did not only induce relevancies to the event, but pre-con-
ﬁgured follow ups for events to come. The story became an identi-
ﬁable entity passing several ‘‘obligatory passage points’’.40 As
adaptable continuation it allowed breaks and ruptures; as integrated
framework it delimited future choices; as arrangement of spatial and
temporal signs it enacted some ‘out-there-ness’.41
Two more speciﬁcations may help to grasp the story’s materiality.
First, the story is well understood as decentred and multiple object
that is, according to John Law, ‘more than one and less than
many’.42 The story, accordingly, includes all references: quotes (‘‘She
then said ‘you…’’) and agreement (‘‘Yes, this is right.’’), assessments
(‘‘So what you are saying then is that she was lying …’’) and com-
ments (‘‘I don’t know!’’), inducements (‘‘This would ﬁt to her ver-
sion …?’’) and denials (‘‘I never said this.’’). A de-centred object is,
40 M. Callon, ‘‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the
Scallops and the Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay’’, in Power, Action and Belief: A New
Sociology of Knowledge? (Sociological Review Monograph, No. 32), J. Law (ed)
(London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1986), 196–223.
41 The latter function is vital for historical accounts. Carter argues that the event
itself oﬀers temporal signs to be re-arranged in historical accounts. See E. Carter,
supra, n. 4. Carter’s concept contributes to the concept of materiality since it iden-
tiﬁes pre-produced co-producers for story-telling and history-writing. Carter, how-
ever, seems to underestimate the speciﬁcity of his example: negotiating and signing a
remarkable bill of sale. Countless other events are routinely or purposefully
accomplished without reference to any dates or hours – no anchors that would
facilitate later reconstruction.
42 An ‘‘object such as an aircraft – an ‘individual’ and ‘speciﬁc’ aircraft – comes in
diﬀerent versions. It has no single centre. It is multiple. And yet these various ver-
sions also interfere with one another and shuﬄe themselves together to a make a
single aircraft. They make what I will call singularities, or singular objects out of
their multiplicity. In short, they make objects that cohere.’’ (J. Law, Aircraft Stories.
Decentring the Object of Technoscience (Durham and London: Duke University
Press, 2002), 2).
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according to Law, extended by each reference to its imagined iden-
tity. This identity forces as well as allows narrators to leave out,
thicken or modify the story and, by doing so, to decentre it even
further. As a consequence, the story appears in a longer time-line as
breathing in and out: it takes in and leaves out details (how long
they knew each other; why at all he walked up to her room; what she
wore; what they drank; what they were talking about etc.). It is one
and it is many.
The metaphor of de-centred objects leads to intriguing mappings
of appearances and their relations. The story comes into view as
distributed and spread. It clearly exceeds the single moments of its
surfacing. The metaphor, however, lacks sharpness when it comes to
the story’s temporality, its sequential unfolding and legal value. First,
the many versions and cross-references do not come into being all at
the same time. Versions and references are not just intertwined but
necessarily precede each other. They come about in a trans-sequential
order. Second, not all re-appearances and cross-references – entering
the researcher’s ‘‘pin-board’’43 – are selected as relevant and usable
version. Some leave their marks and add to the story while others
remain ephemeral. They, while not being memorised, leave the
decentred case-story untouched. Both aspects – sequentiality and
selection – can add to the understanding of the story’s relevancy. The
story as materiality accommodates, what one could call, the
fact-ﬁnding-engine of criminal proceedings: the multiplication of
versions in order to back or undermine situated performances.44
Situated narration in court cannot ignore the decentred story
that was accumulated during pre-trial. Only exceptionally novel
accounts ‘surprise’ the court – and cause some crises – without having
been already checked, exchanged and commented on. There is always
43 Law’s metaphor of the ‘‘pin-board’’ shows this preference for spatial connec-
tions. The pin-board, alike the network, does not allow to reveal the sequentiality of
the story’s enfolding. It does not facilitate to trace the building up of versions and
references (on the basis of previous appearances). Infra, at 2.
44 See especially M. Lynch and D. Bogen, The Spectacle of History – Speech, Text,
and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1996). For micro-sociological approaches see P. Drew, ‘‘Contested Evidence in
Courtroom Cross-examination: The Case of a Trial for Rape’’, in P. Drew and
J. Heritage (eds), Talk at work. Interaction in institutional settings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 470–521; W.D. Darrough, ‘‘When Versions
Collide: Police and the Dialectics of Accountability’’, Urban Life 7/3 (1978),
379–403; S. Harris, ‘‘Fragmented Narratives and Multiple Tellers: Witness and
Defendant Accounts in Trials’’, Discourse Studies 3/1 (2001), 53–74.
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already a prior version laying out ‘what one should say’ and ‘what
better remains unsaid’. Multiplication, in this line, oﬀers some means
to control and reinforce an account. It oﬀers numerous criteria to
question and challenge it. The iterated story becomes rule for its
successors and source for its critiques. Accordingly, witness in Crown
Court have good reasons to hesitate when being asked ‘what hap-
pened’ (even if she/he was the only one at the scene of the crime),
because every reply is assessed in the light of the already told. The
fact-ﬁnding engine, fed by the story’s several versions, creates com-
municable conﬁrmation, modiﬁcation or contradiction – and good
reasons for the jury to agree or disagree.
3. CONCLUSION
At this point, I would like to return to the starting-point: the con-
ceptualisation of materialities of criminal proceedings. How can
courtrooms, ﬁles and stories count as materialities? All three, I
propose, exceed, facilitate and orientate the course-of-interaction:
the court as discourse automat, the scriptural economy of ﬁles and
the iterated story as truth-ﬁnding engine. They are pre-produced and
co-producers.
How do the materialities diﬀer? The three, I argue, vary in the way
they can be observed already before the hearing. They, furthermore,
vary in terms of their becoming and function. This synopsis may
provide some overview and grounds for conclusive reﬂections:
The synopsis illustrates relative properties instead of ﬁxed attri-
butes. The materialities appear as being pre-established only from the
point of view of the hearing: the courtroom with its standardised
speech-positions, the ﬁle as the site of creative/systematic investments
or the story with its intertwined/sequential versions. But careful: the
entities seem immutable in the light of the hearing’s proximity. From
another perspective, e.g. of an historian investigating the rise and fall
of jury-trials, the seemingly solid compositions turn into dynamic
Observable as Procedure is Duration
analogue to
Mode of
production
Rhythm
Court stable standardised Institution Rituals Day-to-day
File accumulative directed Casework Inscriptions Accelerated
Story spread grounded Social career Reference infrequent
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becomings. The same is true for ﬁle or story. What reaches the court
as ﬁxed bundle appears as contingent progression in a historiography
of case-work. All three materialities are in fact relative becomings
with their own speed, duration, drift and rhythm.45 The materialities
correspond to unique time zones that shape the ways in which they
expand and shrink, appear and vanish.46 Materiality, hence, is a
relative state appreciable from a certain focal time-zone.
Time zones can be observed according to the attention and care
necessary to keep things going. A talk, for instance, needs to be
attended by co-present participants according to the grammar of
participation.47 After short periods of mutual silence a conversation
is likely to break down. The need for re-productive care is diﬀerent
compared to our three materialities. The story, for instance, is rather
nomadic. It endures thanks to no more than sporadic references. To
gain legal impact, however, the story needs to pass ‘‘obligatory
passage points’’. The Crown Court is formed in rather ‘‘longue
dure´es’’ (Braudel) generally referred to as legal tradition or culture. It
is exercised in – but not immediately dependent on – the everyday of
‘sitting courts’. The court remains unimpressed by the matter at hand,
which makes it available for those to came. Frequently, a single
standard turns into the subject matter of a legal reform or higher
jurisdiction. And the ﬁle? It is gathered over months of intervallic
ﬁle–solicitor interaction. The attendance rate accelerates closer to the
‘day in court’. The three materialities reveal, as Deleuze puts it,
‘‘other durations that beat to other rhythms’’.48 They reside in
separate time zones.
What does the co-existence of materialities mean for legal prac-
tice? How is this relevant for the analysis of legal discourse? Court,
45 One could employ a whole range of music-terminology such as tempo, bar, beat,
time or rest. One may as well turn towards concepts developed in physics such as
half-life (deﬁned as the ‘‘constant time period required for the disintegration of half
of the atoms in a sample of some speciﬁc radioactive substance’’) or biology such as
rhythmicity in order to represent diﬀerent materialities. See for an overview,
B. Adam, Time & Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
46 The picture is more confusing than the one painted by dualist approaches. An-
thony Giddens e.g., distinguishes linear time and reversal time. Linear time refers to
life histories of humans and institutions, while reversal time is reserved for the realm
of structure, reproduced by the routines of day-to-day-life. See A. Giddens, ‘‘Time,
Space and Regionalisation’’, in The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of
Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
47 H. Sacks, ‘‘Lectures on Conversation’’ in G. Jeﬀerson (ed), Vol. 2 (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992).
48 G. Deleuze, supra 1, 78.
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ﬁle and story (together with other components), as I tried to dem-
onstrate, co-produce the hearing. The hearing as it is (cumulative,
anticipated and condensed) would not be feasible by means of direct
interaction only. The three materialities add a sense of stability,
historicity and expectancy. They ﬁx past events, specify possible
futures and steady expectations. Materialities allow a temporal
division of labour.
Court, ﬁle and story do not simply serve the production of hear-
ings. They are not just functional components, supplementing the
otherwise limited direct interaction. The co-producers do, as well,
disrupt, distract and trouble the hearing. The story’s versions, for
instance, jeopardise any testimony in court no matter its truthfulness;
the court does not provide room for the ‘full story’; and all the ﬁled
information the hearing cannot be fully anticipated by instructions
and scripts etc. Materialities, even though indispensable components,
turn out to be imprecise, lacking and fuzzy when it comes to the
situated utilisation. They trigger secondary problems of orchestration
– and explain the ensembles’ dependency on experienced in-court-
lawyers.49
The materialities do not quite ﬁt to the course-of-discourse. They
comprise wanted and unwanted qualities, helpful and troublesome
aspects, while there is, as Keane makes clear, ‘‘in practice (…) no way
entirely to eliminate that factor of co-presence or what we might call
‘bundling’’’.50 Materialities are, in this humanist view, device and
challenge, prop and troublemaker.51 Materiality, thus, means this as
well: one cannot consume a thing, without taking in unwelcome parts
that are inseparably intertwined.
Interestingly, the ﬁeldwork shows several methods and artefacts to
tackle, what one could call, the problem of disharmonies. In the light
49 See J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University
Press, 2003). Langbein traces the rise of the defence barrister in Crown Court trials.
For centuries, it was on the defendant to represent his/her case.
50 W. Keane, supra n. 4, at 414.
51‘‘Much of everyday life has this character of coping with material agency, agency
that comes at us from outside the human realm and that cannot be reduced to
anything within that realm’’ (A. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1995), 6). For Pickering, praxis resembles a ‘‘dance of
agency, seen asymmetrically from the human end, thus takes the form of a dialectic
of resistance and accommodation, where resistance denotes the failure to achieve an
intended capture of agency in practice, and accommodation an active human
strategy of response to resistance, which can include revisions of goals and intentions
(…)’’ (Infra, at 22). In our framework, strategies can be treated as materialities (from
inside the human realm) comprising resistances and accommodation.
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of the above analysis some components appear as intermediaries or
coupling devices: the barrister as experienced in-court performer shall
harmonise discourse automat and instructed case; the brief as sum-
mary shall harmonise complex ﬁle and concise hearing; the drafted
statement shall harmonise the decentred story and the single testi-
mony; or, last but not least, the barrister’s own notes shall harmonise
brief, examination and ﬁnal speech. The artefacts point, next to the
members’ inventiveness, towards challenges that occur when diﬀerent
materialities get involved. They exemplify the competent eﬀorts to
link various pre-trial investments and the day in court.
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